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feat(server): add workspace secrets for shared refresh material - #5699

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@mrunalp mrunalp commented Nov 18, 2026 •

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Summary

Add workspace secrets: named, workspace-scoped values that provider refresh configuration can reference as minting material, so one shared OAuth client secret rotates for every provider that uses it. OpenShell never injects them into sandboxes. The first commit adds the design RFC; the rest implement it.

Related Issue

Closes #5563

Changes

  • RFC 0024 (rfc/0024-workspace-secrets/): design, threat model, activation and rollback.
  • Secret resource: CreateSecret/GetSecret/ListSecrets/UpdateSecret/DeleteSecret.
    • Values are stored through the credential issuer under a new WorkspaceSecret owner kind and never returned by Get or List.
    • An optional, immutable refresh_use lists the normalized token endpoints the value may be sent to. Without it a secret is reveal-only and cannot be referenced from refresh.
    • Updates stage a new handle and delete the old one. Deletes tombstone the record, and the refresh worker tick sweeps unfinished cleanup.
    • The private record lives in a new openshell.storage.secret.v1 package; the frozen storage.v1 schema is unchanged.
  • Activation: creating secrets and referencing them requires the default-off enable_workspace_secrets setting and a workspace_secrets_protocol membership capability, reusing the sandbox-update check. Workspace deletion is blocked while secrets exist.
  • Refresh references: ConfigureProviderRefreshRequest.material_secrets (key → secret name).
    • Each key must also be listed in secret_material_keys, so older gateways reject the request instead of ignoring it.
    • Only secret material can be referenced, never refresh_token.
    • The effective token endpoint must be one the secret allows. The minter re-checks it before sending and refuses redirects for secret-bearing requests.
    • Bindings live in a refresh-state annotation, which older gateways preserve.
    • Mints read the current value and re-read the record once if an update raced them.
    • DeleteSecret refuses while a refresh references the secret.
    • New InlineProviderRefreshSecrets copies values into provider-owned material and keeps a rotated refresh token.
    • ProviderCredentialRefreshStatus.material_secrets reports the references.
  • RevealSecret: off unless enable_secret_reveal is set. Only mTLS operators may call it (auth_mode: "operator", as for GetProviderCredentials), checked before the setting so other callers learn nothing. OIDC user access is deferred and recorded in the RFC. Every call is audited.
  • CLI:
    • New openshell secret create|update|get|list|delete, which reads values from --value-env or --value-file.
    • provider refresh configure --material-secret KEY=SECRET.
    • provider refresh inline-secrets.
  • Docs: provider refresh, gateway configuration (enable_workspace_secrets, enable_secret_reveal, activation and rollback), workspace scopes, and the openshell-cli skill.

Not in this PR:

Release Notes

Operators can store a shared secret once with openshell secret create and reference it from many providers' refresh configuration with --material-secret. Updating the secret reaches every provider at its next refresh. The feature is off until a gateway sets enable_workspace_secrets.

Testing

  • Checks appropriate to the affected code and behavior pass
    • cargo clippy --workspace --all-targets -D warnings, cargo fmt, buf lint, mise run sdk:ts:ci, and markdownlint on the changed docs and RFC.
    • Unit and integration tests for openshell-server, openshell-credential-issuer, openshell-core, openshell-cli, openshell-sdk, and openshell-gateway-interceptors.
    • The Unix-socket tests in openshell-server and openshell-core fail inside my local sandbox; I reran them outside it and they pass.
    • Not run: ssh_identity::default_credential_store_persists_key_across_runtime_reconstruction, which writes under ~/.local/state.
    • Not run: the Fern docs build.
  • Unit tests added/updated
    • The full refresh lifecycle against a mock token endpoint: mint, rotate the secret, mint with the new value, delete guard, inline, mint again.
    • Rejection rules: unlisted key, inline duplicate, non-secret key, refresh_token, missing secret, disallowed endpoint, tenant override, and activation off.
    • A redirect from an approved endpoint never reaches the target.
    • A mint racing a value update re-reads the record.
    • A lost binding fails closed.
    • Reveal is accepted only for operators and denied to OIDC (any scope), user mTLS and local-dev identities.
    • A reveal-only secret cannot be bound to a refresh, and an empty allowlist permits no endpoint.
    • An inline that overlaps a rotating mint is refused, and the rotated refresh token survives.
    • A secret create that races workspace deletion leaves no row or staged value behind.
    • A create that never publishes (simulated crash) is invisible, blocks workspace deletion until swept, and is never inherited by a recreated workspace with the same name.
    • Plain HTTP to IPv6 loopback is accepted by the minter as it is by endpoint normalization.
    • Cleanup of a pending create that loses to a concurrent publish leaves the published secret and its value intact; this test fails with delete-before-claim.
    • A failed workspace lookup defers pending-create cleanup.
    • A create whose workspace is replaced while it stages never publishes into the replacement.
    • With token_endpoint_auth_method = client_secret_basic (feat(providers): support basic client auth and resource in OAuth refresh #5668), a client_secret from a workspace secret passes configure validation and is sent only in the Basic header.
    • The cleanup sweep reaches pending work behind 1,000 healthy secrets.
    • Configure-time keys are refused as references even when the profile marks them secret.
    • The status table lists material-secret bindings.
    • A secret whose deletion didn't finish stays visible in Get and List, can't be updated, and its name can be reused.
    • Reveal reports nothing about the setting to non-operators.
    • The overlap, race and paging tests were each checked to fail with their fix disabled.
    • Workspace-delete guard.
    • The membership capability check.
    • CLI flag wiring.
  • E2E tests added/updated
    • The RFC's tests against the previous release binary and its Postgres activation path aren't covered yet. SQLite skips the membership check by design.

Checklist

  • Follows Conventional Commits
  • Commits are signed off (DCO)
  • Architecture docs updated (if applicable)

Propose workspace-scoped secrets that provider refresh configuration can
reference, so one shared OAuth client secret rotates for every provider.
Refs #5563.

Signed-off-by: Mrunal Patel <[email protected]>
Add a workspace-scoped Secret resource whose value is stored through the
credential issuer under a new WorkspaceSecret owner kind and is never
returned by Get or List. Each secret declares immutable, normalized token
endpoints it may be sent to.

Creation is gated behind the default-off enable_workspace_secrets setting
and a workspace-secrets membership capability, reusing the sandbox-update
activation check. Updates stage a new value and delete the superseded
handle; deletes tombstone the record and a periodic sweep retries any
backend cleanup. Workspace deletion is blocked while secrets exist.

Refs #5563

Signed-off-by: Mrunal Patel <[email protected]>
Let ConfigureProviderRefresh take secret material from a workspace secret
by name. The gateway binds each key to the secret's immutable ID in a
refresh-state annotation, which older gateways preserve, and requires the
key in secret_material_keys so those gateways reject the request and
refuse to mint without it.

Only secret material can be referenced, never a key the minter rotates
per provider. The token endpoint a mint will call must be one the secret
allows; the minter re-checks it before sending and refuses redirects for
requests carrying a workspace secret. Mints read the secret's current
value and re-read the record once if an update raced them.

DeleteSecret refuses while a refresh references the secret, and the new
InlineProviderRefreshSecrets RPC copies referenced values into
provider-owned material without disturbing a rotated refresh token.

Refs #5563

Signed-off-by: Mrunal Patel <[email protected]>
Return a workspace secret's value to operators, or to OIDC workspace
admins whose token carries the literal secret:reveal scope on a gateway
that enforces scopes. openshell:all, unscoped OIDC gateways, user mTLS
certificates, and local development identities are rejected in the
handler, independent of middleware scope handling. The RPC is disabled
unless enable_secret_reveal is set, and every call is audited.

Group the workspace secret settings under WorkspaceSecretsConfig.

Refs #5563

Signed-off-by: Mrunal Patel <[email protected]>
Add openshell secret create, update, get, list, and delete. Values come
from an environment variable or a file and are never printed. Add
--material-secret to provider refresh configure, which also lists each
referenced key in secret_material_keys, and provider refresh
inline-secrets for unwinding references.

Refs #5563

Signed-off-by: Mrunal Patel <[email protected]>
Describe shared secret material for provider refresh, the
enable_workspace_secrets and enable_secret_reveal gateway settings with
activation and rollback steps, and the new secret scopes.

Refs #5563

Signed-off-by: Mrunal Patel <[email protected]>
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@github-actions github-actions Bot added the state:accepted A maintainer decided OpenShell should pursue this issue label Nov 18, 2026
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mrunalp marked this pull request as ready for review November 18, 2026 14:53
- Refuse InlineProviderRefreshSecrets while a mint is in progress or
  committing, so replacing the refresh state cannot make the mint discard
  a rotated refresh token. A mint that starts later still loses the
  version-checked write to it.
- Re-read the workspace after inserting a secret and undo the insert if
  the workspace was deleted meanwhile, so no secret or staged value
  outlives it.
- Page the cleanup sweep through every secret instead of rereading the
  first 1000, so later tombstones and superseded handles are reached.
- Reject configure-time keys such as refresh_before_seconds as secret
  references even when a profile marks them secret.
- Show workspace-secret bindings in provider refresh status output.

Refs #5563

Signed-off-by: Mrunal Patel <[email protected]>
Point operators at the MATERIAL_SECRETS status column, note that
inlining waits for an in-progress mint, and describe how an older
gateway mints copied values after a downgrade. Update the RFC to match.

Refs #5563

Signed-off-by: Mrunal Patel <[email protected]>
@johntmyers johntmyers added the test:e2e Requires end-to-end coverage label Nov 18, 2026
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/ok to test 739e763

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Label test:e2e applied, but pull-request/5699 does not exist yet. A maintainer needs to comment /ok to test 739e763064167f4bef9f442e04011fd7f4fd55fe to mirror this PR. Once the mirror exists, re-apply the label or re-run Branch E2E Checks from the Actions tab.

- Keep secrets whose deletion did not finish visible in Get and List,
  with their deletion time set, so list pages stay full. Reject updates
  to them, and let CreateSecret finish an interrupted deletion of the
  same name instead of failing with already exists. The CLI shows them
  as deleting.
- Check the RevealSecret principal and workspace role before the
  enable_secret_reveal setting, so unauthorized callers cannot probe it.
- Record provider and credential targets in the InlineProviderRefreshSecrets
  audit event.
- Re-read a referenced secret once when inlining races an update, and
  queue any handle a copied value replaces for deletion.

Refs #5563

Signed-off-by: Mrunal Patel <[email protected]>
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/ok to test 3bcfa18

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PR Review Status

The initial review found no blocking issues in the workspace-secret lifecycle, endpoint restrictions, refresh bindings, or reveal authorization. The test mirror now matches this head after /ok to test; Helm Lint passed, while the new Branch Checks and E2E workflow runs are pending behind earlier runs.

Blocking findings:

  • No blocking findings remain.

Carried findings:

  • None.

Non-blocking suggestions:

  • None.
Gator metadata
  • Validation: Implements accepted issue Support shared non-injectable secret references and authorized control-plane reads #5563; no overlapping open workspace-secrets PR found.
  • Docs: Fern provider, gateway configuration, activation/rollback, and workspace-scope documentation updated; CLI skill updated.
  • Checks: DCO, issue acceptance, Trivy Changes, and current-head Helm Lint passed. Current-head Branch Checks run 44339825808 is pending, without jobs queued yet.
  • E2E: test:e2e is present. Current-head Branch E2E Checks run 44339826326 is pending, without jobs queued yet. No Windows or GPU label required by this diff.
  • Review validation: Independent code-only review covered all 46 changed files. No local tests run; previous-release binary behavior and PostgreSQL activation were inspected without execution.
  • Head SHA: 3bcfa18a5a64a61eab835c631031648f990a29d9
  • Base SHA: f45a2f802fa1243f33cafe048082d15c22a57230
  • Merge base SHA: 4b433e6e3284574866ed0a837a180dbc00ecc800
  • Patch ID: e9a6f8414fc84b29b3ece2eb27cb72b0c4c850a2
  • Gator payload: 13
  • Review mode: initial
  • Previous reviewed SHA: none
  • Review budget exhausted: no
  • Maintainer decision required: no
  • Next state: gator:in-review until required workflow jobs are queued or running, then gator:watch-pipeline.

@johntmyers johntmyers added the gator:in-review Gator is reviewing or awaiting PR review feedback label Nov 18, 2026
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Compatibility review (advisory)

New or updated breaking changes; see the full report for all findings.

1. rust-sdk — No explicit risk acceptance found

raw::proto::open_shell_server::OpenShell now requires create_secret, get_secret, list_secrets, update_secret, delete_secret, reveal_secret, and inline_provider_refresh_secrets.

  • Impact: Existing downstream server/mock implementations fail with missing-trait-item errors even when workspace secrets are disabled; ordinary client callers are unaffected.
  • Action: Provide default UNIMPLEMENTED implementations for the new methods or place them on a separate service so existing implementations remain source-compatible.
  • PR: feat(server): add workspace secrets for shared refresh material #5699

2. rust-sdk — No explicit risk acceptance found

ConfigureProviderRefreshRequest and ProviderCredentialRefreshStatus gain material_secrets, which existing complete Rust struct literals and exhaustive patterns omitted.

  • Impact: SDK consumers constructing or exhaustively destructuring these raw messages fail to compile even without using workspace secrets.
  • Action: Preserve the existing raw message shapes under the no-break policy and expose secret bindings through separate secret-aware messages or RPCs.
  • PR: feat(server): add workspace secrets for shared refresh material #5699

3. typescript-sdk — No explicit risk acceptance found

The exported generated ConfigureProviderRefreshRequest and ProviderCredentialRefreshStatus types gain a required materialSecrets map property.

  • Impact: Consumers supplying complete typed raw message objects or fixtures now fail type-checking, while partial request initializers remain compatible.
  • Action: Preserve the existing exported raw message shapes and introduce separate secret-aware types; create(schema, init) is only a consumer workaround.
  • PR: feat(server): add workspace secrets for shared refresh material #5699
Review details
  • Execution: complete
  • Candidate: PR #5699 (9f9aa761c3b8f727c99975d79e6f4fbad85eebc4)
  • Baseline: f45a2f802fa1243f33cafe048082d15c22a57230 (f45a2f802fa1243f33cafe048082d15c22a57230)
  • Reviewed: rust-sdk, python-sdk, typescript-sdk, api-behavior, cli, configuration, policy, helm, state

Advisory review; publication gates are unchanged.

Branch check run

@johntmyers johntmyers added gator:watch-pipeline Gator is monitoring PR CI/CD status gator:approval-needed Gator completed review; maintainer approval needed and removed gator:in-review Gator is reviewing or awaiting PR review feedback gator:watch-pipeline Gator is monitoring PR CI/CD status labels Nov 18, 2026
Rename the RFC folder and title from the placeholder, move it to review,
and link the implementation PR.

Refs #5563

Signed-off-by: Mrunal Patel <[email protected]>
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/ok to test 159e797

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PR Review Status

I checked @mrunalp’s latest commit assigning workspace secrets to RFC 0024 and moving the RFC to review. The independent follow-up review found no blocking issues in that delta; the prior implementation review remains intact. The test mirror now matches this head, and Branch Checks, Helm Lint, and E2E are running.

Blocking findings:

  • No blocking findings remain.

Carried findings:

  • None.
Gator metadata
  • Validation: Continues the implementation of accepted issue Support shared non-injectable secret references and authorized control-plane reads #5563; scope unchanged.
  • Docs: Existing Fern and CLI-skill updates retained; latest delta assigns the RFC number and review state.
  • Checks: Current-head DCO, issue acceptance, and Trivy Changes passed. Branch Checks run 44352881636 and Helm Lint run 44352881535 are in progress.
  • E2E: test:e2e remains applied. Posted /ok to test for the current head and verified the mirror matches; Branch E2E Checks run 44352882224 is in progress. No rerun needed.
  • Review validation: Bounded independent code-only follow-up; normalized evidence contract contains no findings. No local tests run.
  • Head SHA: 159e79752863a10586f4603026591564cc1c47ff
  • Base SHA: f45a2f802fa1243f33cafe048082d15c22a57230
  • Merge base SHA: 4b433e6e3284574866ed0a837a180dbc00ecc800
  • Patch ID: f4c634ab27610bd8d0544091d59c9bdf6be86875
  • Gator payload: 13
  • Review mode: follow_up
  • Previous reviewed SHA: 3bcfa18a5a64a61eab835c631031648f990a29d9
  • Review budget exhausted: no
  • Maintainer decision required: no
  • Next state: gator:watch-pipeline

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/ok to test 9080a2c

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PR Review Status

I checked @mrunalp’s fix for the pending-create cleanup race, including both publication and cleanup winning, cleanup retries, workspace replacement, and the added regression tests. GATOR-ff06727c-01 is fixed and its review thread is resolved. The independent Critical-only delta review found no new blocking issues; earlier review history remains intact.

The test mirror now matches this head after /ok to test. Helm Lint passed, and Branch Checks and E2E have queued or running jobs.

Blocking findings:

  • No blocking findings remain.

Carried findings:

  • None; GATOR-ff06727c-01 is resolved.
Gator metadata
  • Validation: Continues accepted issue Support shared non-injectable secret references and authorized control-plane reads #5563; remediation stays within the existing subsystem and public surface.
  • Docs: RFC 0024 describes claim-first cleanup and workspace identity checks; existing Fern documentation remains applicable.
  • Checks: Current-head DCO, issue acceptance, Trivy Changes, and docs preview passed. Helm Lint run 44375759047 passed; Branch Checks run 44375759809 has queued and running jobs.
  • E2E: test:e2e retained; refreshed the mirror using the full current head SHA. Branch E2E Checks run 44375760096 has queued and running jobs; no current-head rerun instruction or rerun needed. No Windows or GPU label required by this delta.
  • Review validation: Independent code-only delta review; normalized output has no findings. Regression tests inspected, not executed locally.
  • Head SHA: 9080a2c4a5db53501c4fc64217faa4ff4a1b973b
  • Base SHA: f45a2f802fa1243f33cafe048082d15c22a57230
  • Merge base SHA: 4b433e6e3284574866ed0a837a180dbc00ecc800
  • Patch ID: 9014df2affeebd10846fa0f6fc4adb792e39c29c
  • Gator payload: 13
  • Review mode: critical_only
  • Previous reviewed SHA: ff06727c59913a40f9c0cbb31f27e53edf276d56
  • Review budget exhausted: yes
  • Maintainer decision required: no
  • Next state: gator:watch-pipeline

@johntmyers johntmyers added gator:watch-pipeline Gator is monitoring PR CI/CD status gator:blocked Gator is blocked by process or repository gates gator:approval-needed Gator completed review; maintainer approval needed and removed gator:in-review Gator is reviewing or awaiting PR review feedback gator:watch-pipeline Gator is monitoring PR CI/CD status gator:blocked Gator is blocked by process or repository gates gator:approval-needed Gator completed review; maintainer approval needed labels Nov 18, 2026
…ecrets/mrunalp

Resolve the schema inventory conflict with #4732 by combining the RPC
counts and recomputing the reviewed public fingerprint.

Adapt to #5668, which added Basic client authentication to OAuth refresh:
count a client_secret supplied by a workspace secret as present when
validating token_endpoint_auth_method, and test a Basic mint whose client
secret comes from a workspace secret. Update the new request_token test
and refresh request literal for the merged signatures.

Signed-off-by: Mrunal Patel <[email protected]>
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/ok to test 1e6801f

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PR Review Status

I checked @mrunalp’s merge resolving the schema inventory conflict and adapting workspace-secret references to OAuth Basic client authentication, including the new mint regression test. The independent Critical-only integration review found no new blocking issues; earlier reviews remain intact and GATOR-ff06727c-01 remains resolved.

The merge conflict is cleared. The test mirror now matches this head after /ok to test, and Branch Checks, Helm Lint, and E2E have queued or running jobs.

Blocking findings:

  • No blocking findings remain.

Carried findings:

  • None; GATOR-ff06727c-01 remains resolved.
Gator metadata
  • Validation: Continues accepted issue Support shared non-injectable secret references and authorized control-plane reads #5563; merge integration adds no new subsystem or public configuration surface.
  • Docs: Existing Fern provider, gateway, and workspace documentation remains applicable to this integration.
  • Checks: Current-head DCO, issue acceptance, Trivy Changes, and docs preview passed. Branch Checks run 44422887052 and Helm Lint run 44422887055 have queued or running jobs.
  • E2E: test:e2e retained. Refreshed and verified the mirror at the current head; Branch E2E Checks run 44422887276 has queued jobs. No new Label Help rerun instruction; no rerun needed. No Windows or GPU label required by the PR-owned delta.
  • Review validation: Independent code-only Critical-only review of author merge adaptations and integration; normalized evidence contract has no findings. Tests inspected, not executed locally.
  • Head SHA: 1e6801ff07d2a32696c9a8eabf8913c456e06e26
  • Base SHA: df6a799eb9f2ef92042363ad5b7e0d687c4ec03c
  • Merge base SHA: df6a799eb9f2ef92042363ad5b7e0d687c4ec03c
  • Patch ID: 3e2ab9f6e91a01a9624e9033a470ddbec3afad6e
  • Gator payload: 13
  • Review mode: critical_only
  • Previous reviewed SHA: 9080a2c4a5db53501c4fc64217faa4ff4a1b973b
  • Review budget exhausted: yes
  • Maintainer decision required: no
  • Next state: gator:watch-pipeline

@johntmyers johntmyers added gator:watch-pipeline Gator is monitoring PR CI/CD status gator:blocked Gator is blocked by process or repository gates and removed gator:blocked Gator is blocked by process or repository gates gator:watch-pipeline Gator is monitoring PR CI/CD status labels Nov 18, 2026
…ecrets/mrunalp

Take main's generated default handlers (#5733) in the CLI test servers,
which drops this branch's hand-written secret RPC stubs there. Combine the
audit imports with #5612, and record the refreshed provider for
InlineProviderRefreshSecrets the same way as ConfigureProviderRefresh and
RotateProviderCredential.

Signed-off-by: Mrunal Patel <[email protected]>
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/ok to test 0dba818

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PR Review Status

I checked @mrunalp’s merge of main’s generated test handlers and audit updates, including the retained CLI test behavior and provider identity recorded after inlining refresh secrets. The independent Critical-only integration review found no new blocking issues; earlier review history remains intact and GATOR-ff06727c-01 remains resolved.

The test mirror now matches this head after /ok to test. Branch Checks, Helm Lint, and E2E have queued or running jobs.

Blocking findings:

  • No blocking findings remain.

Carried findings:

  • None; GATOR-ff06727c-01 remains resolved.
Gator metadata
  • Validation: Continues accepted issue Support shared non-injectable secret references and authorized control-plane reads #5563; this merge adds no PR-owned subsystem or public configuration surface.
  • Docs: Existing Fern provider, gateway, and workspace documentation remains applicable; no new direct UX change in the integration delta.
  • Checks: Current-head DCO, issue acceptance, Trivy Changes, and docs preview passed. Branch Checks run 44444715317 and Helm Lint run 44444715148 have queued or running jobs.
  • E2E: test:e2e retained. Refreshed and verified the mirror at the current head; Branch E2E Checks run 44444715655 has queued and running jobs. No new Label Help rerun instruction; no rerun needed. No Windows or GPU label required by the PR-owned delta.
  • Review validation: Independent code-only Critical-only review of author-owned merge resolutions and integration; normalized output has no findings. No local tests executed.
  • Head SHA: 0dba818594ec9ce2096b20cf6be25d3da001b7d9
  • Base SHA: fd3cff606a48b5800d3694e5c3d116897201241e
  • Merge base SHA: fd3cff606a48b5800d3694e5c3d116897201241e
  • Patch ID: 04d30d2984d359e0448512d4531da51edeec9ee0
  • Gator payload: 13
  • Review mode: critical_only
  • Previous reviewed SHA: 1e6801ff07d2a32696c9a8eabf8913c456e06e26
  • Review budget exhausted: yes
  • Maintainer decision required: no
  • Next state: gator:watch-pipeline

@johntmyers johntmyers added gator:watch-pipeline Gator is monitoring PR CI/CD status gator:blocked Gator is blocked by process or repository gates gator:approval-needed Gator completed review; maintainer approval needed and removed gator:blocked Gator is blocked by process or repository gates gator:watch-pipeline Gator is monitoring PR CI/CD status labels Nov 19, 2026

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Support shared non-injectable secret references and authorized control-plane reads

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